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ABSTRACT

strategic sealift, the movement of cargo in support of
deployed troops in an international conflict, relies
primarily on a national asset---a National Defense Reserve
Force, administered by MARAD, and a commercial asset---the
us Merchant Marine.

The decline of the Merchant Marine,

along with the attendant decline and unmanageable nature of
MARAD-administered forces, made sealift (which was once
carried out simply by purchasing space on us carriers) the
limiting factor in the successful execution of Operations
DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.
literature review.

This decline is documented in a

A nine case analysis of sealift

performance, examining three scenarios at three times, is
then presented.

The analysis yields mixed results .

cases sealift is sufficient, in others, it is not.

In some
The

substandard cases point to areas ripe for changes in policy
or procurement.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

Shipping resources in Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT
STORM (hereafter referred to as DS/DS) proved unequal to
national emergency requirements that were legislatively
mandated and operationally set by the Department of Defense
(DoD).

DESERT SHIELD was plagued with a situation where

actual deliveries of supplies, coordinated primarily by the
Navy's Military Sealift Command (one of the three arms of a
Transportation Command tasked with providing air, land and
sea transportation to meet national security objectives),
lagged behind Central Command requirements.

Due to the

absence of hostilities during the deployment, the
Transportation Command had more than five months to overcome
initial problems and deliver the needed supplies before
DESERT STORM began.

The Transportation Command's support of

the deployment needs of the Central Command was not

1

accomplished however, as rapidly, efficiently, and
effectively as intended (GAO, 1992).

Most of the deficiency

in support can be attributed to large-scale shortcomings in
non-DoD controlled shipping assets, specifically in the
Maritime Administration (MARAD)-administered National
Defense Reserve Force (NDRF) and US Merchant Marine, with
respect to both ships and manning.
Three years later, with the possibility of major
conflict looming as it always does, especially on the
distant Korean Peninsula, the US has not made improvements
in non-DoD shipping significant enough to overcome the
deficiencies.

The military's regional commanders say

shortages of sealift make academic the ongoing debate over
the size of the force needed to win two wars at once.
Today's military can barely move enough equipment to conduct
a humanitarian operation and training exercise
simultaneously (Matthews, 1994).

To deploy initial forces

to two regional conflicts at once would require moving as
much cargo in two months as was moved during the first six
months of Operation DESERT STORM (Maze, 1994).

Clearly, the

US may still be unable to provide sealift for only one war.
In the face of this situation, DoD has embarked on what many
feel is an ill-fated acquisition path that, if carried out,
would place all sealift assets under its ownership, exposing

2

it to expenses that may not be satisfied given the
volatility of defense budgets.
Meanwhile, the Merchant Marine continues a precipitous
decline that began in the early 1950s.

It may soon join the

ranks of great American industries that have gone by the
wayside (Misch, 1993).

Legislation initiated in the 102nd

Congress to strengthen maritime security aspects of the
Merchant Marine was not considered.

More legislation has

been introduced in the 103rd Congress .
will not do much.

Even if passed, it

Its provisions are on a small scale

compared with past efforts in support of the US Merchant
Marine.
Concurrently, the other leg of non-DoD shipping, the
MARAD-supplied National Defense Reserve Force (NDRF), faces
problems of similar gravity.

The Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ,

the operational arm of the NDRF, enjoyed a year of full
funding in the wake of the Gulf War.

still, funding was cut

again in Fiscal Year (FY) 1993 as more assets were devoted
to prepositioned shipping.
The decline of the Merchant Marine and problems with
MARAD-administered shipping has risen to crisis proportions.
The individual declines are very much intertwined.
gradual and ongoing.

They are

Finally, they are part of a larger

trend that points away from an earlier heyday of maritime

3

supremacy.

Taken together, these developments pose a

serious threat to national security.

Hypothesis

It is hypothesized that this nation is unable to
provide acceptable sealift for a wide range of conceivable
national emergencies.

This is due mainly to deficiencies in

the two non-DOD controlled shipping assets---MARADcontrolled National Defense Reserve Forces, and US Merchant
Marine Shipping.

These are, by law, the most significant

source of strategic sealift.

Methodology

This study is accomplished in two steps, using
qualitative and quantitative methods, respectively.

In the

first step, the literature is reviewed to extract
qualitative, or anecdotal, deficiencies in sealift.

This

step is a necessary foundation for the second, or
quantitative step that examines sealift shortfalls.
first step frames the problem and adds clarity to the

4

The

assumptions and initial conditions in the analysis performed
in step two.

For instance, in step two it is assumed that

the reduction in US-flagged ships and merchant seamen will
lead to a situation where no ocean-going merchant vessels
will be available for sealift by the end of the century.

In

the second step, the operational case in DS!DS is examined
against the normative case---what should have happened in
DS!DS based on statutory directives and the explicit
principles of the National Security Sealift Policy (Pena,
1993), and a future case---what sealift capability can be
expected based on current acquisition plans and directives.
The future case, an application of the analysis to the year
1999, is included in order to frame current developments and
policy-making with respect to improvements that can be made.
Each of these three cases is subject to a test at three
times to yield a total of nine cases .
This study is based on four primary assumptions.
is reasonable.

Each

Each is essential to the validity of the

study.
First, the Gulf War provides a good model for massive
strategic sealift.

It was the largest mobilization of

troops since the Vietnam War and the most concentrated
sealift operation since World War II

(Martinez, 1992).

This

assumption takes into account the fact that DS!DS was not a

5

worst-case scenario.

It had massive yet relatively benign

operational requirements.

Shortages in sealift did not

result in the loss of American lives.

This was due to the

favorable factors present in the sealift operation.

These

included:
-allied control of air and shipping lanes.
-six months, unopposed, to build an offensive
inventory.
-access to modern port facilities.
-no battle damage to ports or attrition of shipping.
-shipyards with drydocks in the area.
-ample supplies of fuel in the area.
-near unanimous support for the effort, making foreign
flagged ships and crews readily available.
-the opportunity to phase activation of RRF vessels,
mitigating difficulties in repairing, crewing, and
activating vessels (Martinez, 1992).

The second assumption is that sealift operations since
DS/DS have been on too small a scale to evaluate the overall
apparatus effectively.
category.

The operation in Somalia fits this

Operation RESTORE HOPE utilized but a small

fraction of the sealift inventory.
Third, non-DoD sealift assets have not changed
considerably in the three years since the Gulf War.
6

No

sweeping legislative changes have occurred, procurement
efforts in the last three years, excepting a few ships and
charter arrangements, have not yet come to fruition and
regardless have focused only on surge-shipping assets that
will come on line mid-decade, and finally,

the US Merchant

Marine continues its decline.
Fourth, the abundance of petroleum in the operating
area makes analysis of petroleum shipments, even though they
exceeded cargo shipments on a tonnage basis, of little use.
Shipments of fuel on tankers represent a very small fraction
of that used in the theater during DS/DS.

On the other

hand, general cargo ships transported combat, combat
support (CS), and combat systems support (CSS)
well as sustainment cargo.

equipment, as

As much as 95 % of these types of

cargo must be moved by sea (Goodhue, 1993).

Due to this

disparity, the study disregards all shipments of petroleum
and voyages by tankers.

Significance

A large body of literature has been devoted to broader
issues related to the context of this study.

These include

the decline of the US Merchant Marine, policy deficiencies

7

within the USDOT, and the lack of US capability to deploy
large forces to "hot-spots," now that the cold war is over
and extensive forward deployment has been abandoned.
Comparatively little attention has been given to how the
decline in the US Merchant Marine, and a maritime auxiliary,
MARAD, has affected parameters outside of employment or
economic strength.
The nine cases this study examines build on an
extremely detailed and in-depth two-case study of
operational sealift completed by Shuford (1990).

That study

was completed in the fall of 1990, before the halfway point
of Desert Shield.

Thus, it was only able to examine surge

shipping for the operation.

Not surprisingly, it revealed

across the board shortages.

The study, along with the data

on which it was based, are not for public distribution.
Still, enough data exist in the public literature to perform
a quantitative analysis that is not excessively disjunctive.
This study attempts to do just that.

It complements the

analysis with a literature review that tries to make sense
of diverse, and often parochial, literature that is
tangential to the subject at hand.
This study is significant in that it documents how two
organizations, MARAD and the US Merchant Marine, that exist
mainly for the interest of marine commerce, can in their
decline profoundly affect this nation's most basic
8

requirement---security.

It frames this problem with respect

to an actual occurrence (the results of which at least
approximate current capability).

This allows conclusions to

be inferred that might rectify problems with and among the
myriad entities involved in national defense, government,
and industry, toward an end result---satisfactory shipping
in support of US forces in conflict.

These conclusions will

show the utility in fixing current deficiencies through
revitalization of the commercial sector (by demonstrating
the futility in purchasing an entire sealift fleet),
point to improvements in MARAD necessary to that
revitalization.

9

and

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

History

In the mid-1970s, with the drawdown of the military and
the advent of the Rapid Deployment Force, the nascent stages
of a new military strategy emerged.

This strategy shunned

exclusive reliance on nuclear weapons and large forwarddeployed forces in favor of responsiveness.

As times

changed, and the need to project forces rapidly gained
urgency, strategic mobility, the key to reinforcement,
became the cornerstone of the National Military Strategy
(Pasquarette and Foster, 1994).

Thus, in the 1980s, the US

Navy added sealift and its support as a fundamental mission
to its other three: strategic nuclear deterrence, protecting
the sea lines of communication, and power projection.
The new strategy came at an unfortunate time with
respect to trends in the US Merchant Marine.

The US

Merchant Marine has steadily declined from its all time high

10

at the end of WWII.

In the 1950s and 1960s, during the

conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, it still comprised over a
thousand ships and scores of commercial operators.

This

climate made it possible for the US Merchant Marine alone to
meet sealift requirements (Flyntz, 1992).
the decline was in full swing.

By 1970, however,

US-flagged market share had

been reduced eightfold, from .42.6% of the world market to a
mere 5.3 % (Figure 1).

It was no longer possible to meet the

initial requirements of sealift by acquiring commercial
space.

For this reason, the RRF was developed in 1976

(Joint DoD/DOT Ready Reserve Force Working Group (RRFWG),
1991) .
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FIGURE 1: DECLINE OF THE US MERCHANT MARINE
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Despite the establishment of the RRF,

studies concluded

more strategic lift would be required in a host of war-gamed
scenarios within the range of possibility.

A DoD sealift

study revealed significant shortages in sealift.

Its

results mandated a new policy formulation in which the US
would seek commitments from allied shipping in times of
national emergency.

This policy was the first of its kind.

Later, the Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense
identified large shortfalls in ships and seagoing labor.
Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff commissioned a Revised
Intertheater Mobility Study that looked at sealift together
with airlift and prepositioned assets.

It revealed

shortfalls so great that the DoD never approved the results.
After these reports, President Bush approved a national
sealift policy in 1989 (Gibson and Shuford, 1991).
The policy was sorely tested in 1990 after the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait.

This test revealed many deficiencies.

The US found it did not have the ability to deliver the
cornerstone of a rapidly deployed force,

that is, a heavy

division with its gear,

Delivery of combat

in three weeks.

and support forces did not meet the expectations of the
operational commanders.

More troublesome, many weaknesses

identified in the studies of the 1980s were only partially
addressed.
13

Still, the weaknesses were revealed at small cost as
the circumstances of the operation allowed shortfalls in
sealift.

An international coalition in line with

us

us

interests allowed easy access to foreign shipping assets.
This mitigated the suboptimum performance of the US-flagged
merchant fleet and the incomplete (and in the cases of many
ships,

late) activation of the RRF.

Additionally,

the RRF

performance, although poor from the viewpoint of the field
commander, proved acceptable given the long delay between
deployment in

DESERT SHIELD and combat in DESERT STORM

(Gibson and Shuford, 1991).

Indeed, the performance of

sealift in DS/DS is characterized as excellent in government
reports by many agencies involved in its execution.
However, after the war, some assessments of sealift
capability were harsh in media and military circles.

In the

Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman's (JCSC) 1991 Joint Military
Net Assessment, the JCSC said that in the early weeks of a
short-warning war in Southwest Asia, or in two simultaneous
regional conflicts,

"shortages will exist in airlift,

sealift, or pre-positioned supplies
potentially grave consequences"
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[that could have]

(Powell, 1991).

Desert Shield/Desert Storm

Most Americans would characterize the Persian Gulf War
as a success.

The United States forged a broad coalition

against the aggressor, defeated her with a minimum of
casualties, and brokered a settlement that stabilized the
area, at least for the time being.

The outcome was no doubt

a factor in the world's oil surplus.
than it did before the war.

Oil costs less now

More important, however, is the

fact that DS/DS tested American forces in a scenario that
will likely be replayed in the future.

It was a crisis that

required mobile contingency forces to move quickly and on
short notice.

For precisely this reason, significant

lessons were learned.

Of these lessons learned, a prime one

is that sealift, the movement of cargo in national
emergencies to deploy armed forces, was not up to the
standards used to formulate national military policy.

This

was mainly due to deficiencies in shipping and manning with
respect to non-DoD assets .

These deficiencies are

outgrowths of spectra of misguided maritime and defense
policies and an overall trend away from maritime supremacy.
The shortfalls are split into two areas.

The first

expresses how the decline of the Merchant Marine has
adversely affected the nation's ability to conduct sealift.
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This decline has been precipitated by policy shifts that
assume availability of allied shipping in conflicts,
legislation that removed long standing subsidies and
incentives, and manning problems.
the arena of sealift programs.

The second problem is in

The success of DoD-

controlled assets such as the twenty-five Maritime and
Afloat Prepositioned Ships (MPS/APS) and nearly acceptable
performance of the eight MSC-controlled fast-sealift ships
(FSSs) are in stark contrast to the problematic National
Defense Reserve Force (NDRF).

The NDRF consists of a fast-

sealift component, Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships
designated ROS-4 on four-day recall or RRF-5 ships on fiveday recall, the remainder of the RRF ships, which round out
MARAD's surge shipping assets, on ten or twenty-day recall,
and the Inactive Reserve Force (IRF), which theoretically
exists to support the highest levels of mobilization.
These areas, the decline of the Merchant Marine and
problems with MARAD-administered assets, overlap when
problems with fleet composition and readiness are examined
with respect to the types of ships that supply contingency
forces.

These ships include unitized general cargo ships---

Roll-on Roll-off ships (RO/RO), barge ships (LASH/SEABEE)
and container ships (LO/LO)---breakbulk ships, tankers, and
possibly, troopships.

16

There was very little volunteer foreign shipping in
DS/DS although the allied coalition consisted mainly of oil
importers who relied heavily on Persian Gulf oil exports.
However, most of MSC's initial charters were foreignflagged.

After the surge portion of DESERT SHIELD, over

half of the seventy-three ships chartered were from foreign
fleets

(Gibson and Shuford, 1991).

By the end of DS/DS, the

US had hired 165 ships from twenty-seven countries.

These

were militarily useful vessels not in the US inventory.
Some ships came at exorbitant rates.

For example, a

Norwegian RO/RO was chartered at a rate of $16,000 a day,
double its normal price (Gourdin and Clarke, 1992).
ships came with political strings attached.

Other

This was

undoubtedly the case with ships supplied from Japan and the
Soviet Union (Ackley, 1992).

Among these charters, one

foreign-flagged ship under MSC's control did not go into the
Gulf and other ships slowed en route

(Donovan, 1992) .

More

troublesome, DS/DS represented ideal conditions, where a
broad coalition left Iraq without maritime allies.

This

underscored the inadequacy of US-flagged sealift assets
overall and displayed the effect on national security of the
decline in the US Merchant Marine given the DoD assumption
that foreign flagged vessels are reliable sources of
sealift.

17

The decline of the Merchant Marine, and the attendant
loss of Merchant Mariners, has greatly affected sealift
readiness.

Limited operations diminished the employment

pool of trained mariners to draw upon in DS/DS to 11,000
personnel, down 60 % since 1970.

Despite the existence of a

federal Merchant Marine Academy,

six state Merchant Marine

Academies, and seventeen Merchant Marine training
facilities,

as US-flagged merchant shipping declines,

fewer

jobs become available.

Hence graduates must change careers.

Their licenses expire.

Their desire to return to sea is low

(Ackley, 1992).

The bottom line is that the shortage of

merchant mariners is not due to a lack of sailors, but
rather, a lack of ships (Donovan, 1991).

Lastly, the

merchant mariner is not protected like his seagoing navy
counterpart.

Without programs for merchant mariners similar

to those available to naval reservists, i.e., salary
protection and reemployment rights, manning expectations can
not be fully met (Donovan,

1992).

Another major problem is the effect the timing of
activations has on manning pools.

DS/DS showed that while

it is easy to produce one crew to man one ship,

it is

something entirely different to produce seventy crews in
five days.

Initial obligations for sealift in DESERT SHIELD

required approximately fourteen-hundred mariners for the
first 44 ships from August 10 to September 22
18

(Flyntz,

1992).

The immediacy of the project stretched the pool of

merchant mariners considerably.

Mariners in their seventies

(some sources report eighties) deployed on sealift missions
as the union halls were scraped to the bone.
The manning shortage should not have been unexpected.
From its inception, the RRF was never exercised in a
meaningful manner.
fully validated.

As a result, crew availability was never
Examining test activations prior to DS/DS

shows cases where the same crew members participated.

Test

call-ups resulted in predictable affirmative responses from
merchant mariners as to their availability.

When DS/DS

materialized, there was naturally far less willingness among
those same merchant mariners to give up current employment
or the opportunity for better employment in order to take an
arduous, and historically dangerous,

job of unknown duration

(FI yn t z , 1992).
Government sealift can be split into three categories,
prepositioned shipping, MSC fast-sealift shipping, and the
NDRF.

DS/DS showed the least troublesome of these

categories was DoD-controlled prepositioned shipping (APS
and MPS).

Among the remainder, the highest priority vessels

or fast-sealift ships performed acceptably but not up to
activation requirements specified in MARAD and MSC
directives.

More important, DS/DS brought up serious

questions as to the disposition and deployment of the
19

remainder of the NDRF, consisting of RRF ships, maintained
to meet surge sealift requirements, and IRF ships.
In DS!DS, the prepositioned squadrons did exceptionally
well.

Two of the three MPSs, which supply Marine

Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs), the force contingents often
sent first in military deployments, were ordered to sail on
August 7, 1990.

Each squadron put to sea on the August 8,

and off-loaded in Saudi Arabia on August 16, where the First
and Seventh MEBs,
1992).

airlifted in, met their gear (Donovan,

Eight of the Twelve APS ships, long-term MSC

charters that supply Army and Air Force elements, had offloaded their equipment within a week of being ordered to
sail.

The successful operation of these ships resulted in

the deployment of two MEBs,

and the prepositioning of

significant amounts of Army and Air Force Cargo.

This, in

addition to light infantry elements of the 82nd Airborne and
air support from two aircraft carriers, may have prevented
an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia early in DESERT SHIELD.
The fact that an early invasion did not take place was
fortunate for allied forces, because other sealift support
arrived late to varying degrees.
The MSC's FSSs, priority vessels that are maintained in
a four-day readiness state by merchant mariners under
contract, deployed on average in six days for DESERT SHIELD
(Gibson and Shuford, 1991).

This was unacceptable given the
20

urgent nature of the supply effort.

Nonetheless, the FSSs

performed better than the RRF.
During DS/DS, the RRF, maintained in a five,

ten, or

twenty day readiness status, experienced scores of
activation problems.

In DESERT SHIELD, of the seventeen RRF

ships in a five-day readiness status initially requested,
only three were provided in the required five-day response
time (Navy News, 1990).

Less than one-third of the

activated ships reached their designated loading ports on
time.

The commander of the MSC, Admiral Donovan,

felt the

system had false expectations of the ability to break out
many RRF ships in five days.

Some ships had been idle,

along with their engineering plants, for up to thirteen
years

(Donovan, 1992).

As such, their steam-driven

propulsion plants were prone to leaks from dried-out packing
in valves and pumps, and breakage associated with the
mechanical stresses of plant heat-up.

Of the ninety-six

ships in the RRF at the time of DS/DS, only forty-four were
activated in the surge portion of the conflict.
assets, i.e.,

As other

foreign-flagged vessels, were used in the RRF

activation period, one could make the case that some ships
in the RRF were unusable (Gibson and Shuford, 1991).
Seventy-nine of the RRF vessels did eventually deploy during
DS/DS

(Card, 1992b), but a significant portion, nearly one

in five, did not.

This lack of activation may be explained
21

to some extent by a smaller need for tankers and break-bulk
ships, compared to a great need for RO/ROs in the conflict.
But clearly, some ships deferred action on known material
deficiencies until activation was required.

This led to

documented delays in activating RRF vessels, or prevented
activation altogether.
DS/DS revealed inadequacies in the composition of ships
in the nation's RRF.

The most glaring of these shortfalls

was the lack of Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO)
war.

shipping in the

Tanks, personnel carriers, mortar emplacements and the

like are best transported on decks where they can be rolled
on and shipped, then rolled off and deployed.

At the time

all of the RO/ROs in the RRF were called to action, less
than one-third of the breakbulk ships and less than onetenth of the tankers were deployed.

In fact, MSC had to

charter nineteen RO/ROs, most of foreign registry, in the
first month of DESERT SHIELD (Gibson and Shuford, 1991).
DS/DS plainly showed that RO/RO assets in the RRF and
commercial sector combined are insufficient to meet the
demands of an action of its size (Donovan, 1992).

This is

not to say that there were not deficiencies in other areas.
The Marine Corps had urgent requirements for container
assets during DS/DS.

Many Marine Corps-procured containers

had to be shipped on foreign vessels after MSC verified
nonavailability of US- flagged vessels (Pena, 1993).
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Finally, it must be noted that some problems with
sealift during DS/DS were extrinsic to the Merchant Marine
or MARAD.

Management problems especially were not confined

to MARAD.

MSC's management of sealift assets was often

chaotic and undisciplined.

MSC reports identified several

instances where ships were not properly matched with cargo.
One factor in bringing this about was the performance of
MSC's Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JaPES).
JaPES was substandard for several reasons.

It was immature

and thus it was not well integrated with the systems of the
individual armed services.

It could not accommodate the

rapid changes in force requirements during DS/DS.
it lacked proficient operators.

Finally,

These problems were often

compounded when requirement data supplied by the services
were inaccurate.

The end result was a need to schedule

additional ships for sealift.

It also necessitated calling

in cargo out of priority order (GAO, 1992).

The Declining Merchant Marine

The rapidly dwindling US-flagged fleet presents a huge
problem in the execution of successful sealift operations.
In the 1980s, the government responded to the problem by
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expanding its ownership of merchant ships.

The decision to

rely on ships under direct control continues today.

MSC's

role as operator of additional dedicated sealift vessels
points toward a goal of a self-contained logistics system
within DoD (Pouch, 1994).

Although MSC still spends one

billion dollars per year on the US maritime industry, making
it the largest customer for US liners and most shipyards, it
is shying away from the traditional use of the merchant
fleet as the primary element of military emergency shipping
(Vail, 1993).

In fact, congressional maritime leaders

believe a "quiet revolution" is going on behind closed doors
in DoD that points to a building agenda that has little, if
any, room for commercial sealift.

The procurement portion

of the agenda alone could cost US taxpayers $6 billion
(Beargie, 1993b).

This effort may hurt the national defense

posture in that economically productive assets

(US-flagged

merchant ships) that can be used for sealift are being
replaced by dedicated defense assets subject to budget
restrictions.
Sealift is a current priority.

In FY90, before the

onset of Ds/DS, DoD allocated only $375 million to
construction of sealift ships.

Yet in FY91 and FY92

Congress appropriated $1.875 billion for sealift
construction.
initiated.

As a result, large contracts have been

In September of 1993, the Navy awarded National
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Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) a $1.3 billion
contract for six strategic sealift ships to be supplied
through 2001

(Wall Street Journal, 1993) .

This was on top

of $1.1 billion in contracts awarded to NASSCO and Newport
News Shipbuilding in July to convert five containerships to
RO/RO vessels

(Beargie, 1993b).

Contrasting the situation that the initiation of these
contracts conveys is the reality that the US merchant fleet
is facing a bleak future.

America's US-flagged merchant

fleet may be virtually extinct by the year 2000 (Card,
1992a).
today.

The US-flagged seagoing fleet contains 359 vessels
This fleet ships less than four percent of the

world's oceangoing trade.

MARAD estimates the fleet will be

reduced by two-thirds by the end of the decade.

DoD's

estimate is even worse---an 81 % reduction of oceangoing
merchant vessels

(Pouch, 1994).

A reduction this deep would

signal an end to the US Merchant Marine's ability to provide
meaningful sealift.

Regardless of where the fleet ends up

with respect to the preceding estimates, it will probably be
reduced to a small fleet kept alive by the last vestiges of
protectionism.

Cargo preferences mandated by the Cargo

Preference Act of 1904 (all items procured for or owned by
DoD must be carried in US-flagged vessels), and the Cargo
Preference Act of 1954 (half of the gross tonnage of
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government-generated cargo must be carried on US-flagged
ships) will sustain the oceangoing fleet at a fiducial level
of little or no use for national security.
This trend has started.

Two large US-flagged shipping

companies, SeaLand and American President Lines, have said
they intend to begin to reflag in 1995, if comprehensive
tax, manning, and operational policies are not changed
(Card, 1992a).

Both companies have reflagging applications

on file at MARAD but there is no legal deadline for MARAD to
act (Beargie, 1993c) and executive order prohibits
reflagging for the time being (Marti, 1993).

Nonetheless,

statements from the two lines suggest reflagging will take
place unless Congress enacts a new maritime reform program
that includes financial support for the carriers (Beargie,
1993a) .
The removal of financial support has placed the US
merchant fleet on the precipice of extinction.

Abrupt

elimination of Construction Differential Subsidies (CDS) and
Operating Differential Subsidies (ODS), in 1982 and 1981
respectively, after nearly one-half century of their
existence, is indeed proving to be the death-knell for the
Merchant Marine (Marti, 1993).
CDSs was immediate.

The effect of elimination of

A total of four commercial ship orders

has been placed in private US shipyards in the last nine
years

(Misch, 1994d) and US shipyards share of worldwide
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commercial shipbuilding has concurrently shrunk from ten
percent to zero.

ODSs, since they were guaranteed in

contracts of up to twenty years in length, are slowly being
phased out of existence.

As a result, subsidies have

decreased yearly and will decrease to zero when the last
contract expires in 2001.

Annual outlays have dropped to

just above $200 million from near $400 million in the early
1980s.

Recent legislation seeks to restore subsidies, but

it may be too little and too late.
The impending ouster of the Bush Administration in 1992
opened the door for subsidy legislation.

A maritime reform

policy was proposed in the Maritime Reform Act (HR 5627) of
1992.

This Act sought to amend the Merchant Marine Act of

1936, as amended, to establish a Contingency Retainer
Program providing federal assistance for up to 74 vessels
for seven years, beginning at $2.5 million per ship per year
in the first two years and phasing down to $1.6 million per
ship in the seventh year, and to improve the US-flagged
merchant marine.

The bill was not passed by the end of the

102nd Congress and was not subsequently reintroduced
(Congressional Index, 1992, 1993).
However, the 103rd Congress introduced similar
legislation in House Bills 2151 and 2152.

These were backed

by Rep. Gerry Studds, D.-Mass., Chairman of the House
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee.
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The bills seek to

amend the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended, through
the establishment of a maritime security fleet and seek to
encourage merchant marine investment, respectively
(Congressional Index, 1993).
House Bill 2151, the Maritime Security and
Competitiveness Act of 1993, would subsidize US foreign
commerce vessels at a level of $2.3 million in FY94, and
$2.1 million for nine years thereafter.

Vessels covered,

estimated at fifty-two to seventy over the next ten years,
include general cargo vessels (RO/RO, barge carrying
vessels, or container vessels), vessels that hold ODS
contracts currently, and other vessels deemed acceptable to
the government in national emergencies.

The bill also makes

a small move toward reintroduction of long-lost CDS payments
through "transition payments" to US shipyards for
construction of some commercial vessels (Beargie, 1993c).
Still, the bill does not do much to stop the dangerous
decline in US Merchant Marine assets.

Subsidies in the $1.2

billion bill would average about $120 million per year, less
than two-thirds of the current residual ODS payments.
Unless the program is broadened to cover approximately 100
ships, carriers will probably continue to switch ships to
foreign flags

(Beargie, 1993c).
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Although the shipping lines are optimistic that the
Senate will indeed broaden the program (the bill passed the
House overwhelmingly, 347-65, on November 4, 1993 after an
Administration Policy Statement supported it), there is
little reason to believe this will be the case.
are primary.

Two factors

First, the Administration's support statement

promised work to fund the bill at "approximately one billion
dollars over ten years."

Two billion dollars over this

period would be the minimum to keep payments where they are
now.

As all discretionary spending must identify funding

sources, it is unlikely that additional monies will be
found.

There is also the danger that money to fund the

program will corne from sources directly tied to the industry
(Reed, 1994).

Second, Administration support for a broad

and sustained subsidy program is questionable.
Vice President Gore's National Policy Review (NPR)
commission leaked a draft paper in July of 1993 that
recommended, among other things, an end to the maritime
subsidy program.

The FMC and maritime industry lobbyists,

along with many members of Congress and Transportation
Secretary Pena, convinced the Gore panel to pull back from
this recommendation (Vail, 1993).

The effort succeeded in

that the final report released in September 1993 dropped
this recommendation (Bonney, 1993).

But Administration

support for sustained, generous subsidies is doubtful.
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Along these lines, the premier institution in the
training of merchant mariners, The Merchant Marine Academy,
was among the federal institutions slated for closure in
1998 in Vice President Gore's NPR.

Congress has not yet

mandated this recommendation, but the school's $37 million
annual price tag makes it an easy target, especially since
it sends graduates to a dying industry.

Since the

elimination of subsidies about one decade ago, only about a
third of each graduating class has been able to find a
billet on a ship (Fielder, 1993).

MARAn and the NDRF

MARAD learned many lessons from DS/DS and took some
corrective actions as a result.

These actions address

manning, port locations, and maintenance.
measures cover operational issues.

All of the

If executed, they will

make the existing force far more capable (bringing it near
its touted capability).

This capability is examined in the

next chapter under the normative case, which assumes the
operational improvements are successful.

Nonetheless,

administrative improvements matter little if the hard assets
are missing.

On this issue, it is obvious that fleet
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composition, especially with respect to ship types and ages,
is suboptimal.
Before any other issue is examined, it must be stated
that the ability to carry out any measures on a continuing
basis hinges on funding, which has been volatile.

In FY90,

before DS/DS, MARAD requested $239 million for the RRF .
Co n g r e s s approved barely one-third of that.

This funding

was so low that the Secretary of Transportation, Samuel
Skinner, stated "the readiness status of many Ready Reserve
Fleet Ships is not realistic"

(Phillips, 1990).

Funding

shot up to $165 million for FY91, nearly double the previous
year's allowance, in the midst of the difficulties revealed
in getting RRF ships underway.

However, funding for the

program was reduced again, to $116 million,

for FY92.

In response to the abysmal performance of the five-day
RRF in DS/DS, MARAD contracted retention crews, consisting
of two licensed marine engineers, for several ships assigned
five-day readiness.

Today, 21 ships employ two-person crews

that conduct preventative maintenance and provide the base
of a deployable operating crew (Pena, 1993).
Next, MARAD created an entirely new readiness category
for its highest priority vessels.

This category was

designated ROS-4, for four-day Reduced Operating Status.
ROS-4 vessels are now crewed by ten persons, licensed and
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unlicensed, who live aboard year-round.

Seventeen ships now

have ROS maintenance crews (Pena, 1993).
Many guidelines for administering the RRF were
overhauled.

An Outporting Program was implemented in order

to provide contracted lay-berths for RRF ships near expected
loading ports.

Fifty RRF vessels were assigned to outport

locations by October of 1992.

Vessels in the RRF are now

subject to a "no known material deficiency" policy that
mandates that known deficiencies are to be corrected while
the vessel is in inactive status.

Lastly, existing DoD

requirements for logistics and material readiness were
clarified to MARAD.

The US Coast Guard was engaged to

monitor these requirements as part of the ship inspection
criteria for the RRF (Pena, 1993).
Despite these actions, DoD made an effort to place the
RRF under its control in June of 1993.

A legislative

proposal cited inefficient employment of the RRF in DS/DS
and the similarities among its fast-sealift ships and the
MSC FSSs as reasons to execute the transfer.

The Deputy

Secretary of Defense held the proposal in abeyance until the
US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) could complete a
detailed feasibility study (Jeremiah, 1993).
USTRANSCOM recommended that the management of the RRF
program remain with MARAD.

It found no evidence of cost

savings in transferring the RRF to DoD.
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This left the

decision to be made based on operational and policy issues.
On this basis, given the level of funding provided,
USTRANSCOM found that the RRF,

three years after DS/DS, is

being managed in an efficient and effective manner.
Concurrently, the study mandated that management of the FSS
program should remain within DoD to ensure rapid and
reliable sealift in any conting ency (USTRANSCOM, 1993)

It

is noteworthy that the study did not address whether the RRF
is capable of completing its legislatively-set mission or
what contingencies the RRF is unprepared for.

Regardless,

the consolidation under DoD did not take place.

Stateside

sealift capability (this, by definition, excludes
prepositioned shipping)

is thus administered as shown in

Table 1.

33

TABLE 1: STATESIDE GOVERNMENT-ADMINISTERED SEALIFT

Readiness
Availability
(days)

FSS

ROS-4

RRF-5

RRF-10

RRF-20

5

10

20

Yes

Yes

0

0

4

4

Shipyard work
required?

No

No

Yes

Crew size

21

10

2

Ported

load loading
port port

shipyard

shipyard

near NDRF
fleets

sea trials/yr

2

1

~

~

~

dock trials/yr

4

0

~

~

~

Source: USTRANSCOM, 1993
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DS/DS revealed severe deficiencies in the composition
of the RRF.

The composition of the RRF favors older

breakbulks and tankers.

Tankers will indeed be crucial in

conflicts where oil is not readily available (oil and
refined products were abundantly available in Saudi Arabia)
But RRF tankers are small,

far smaller than the typical

carriers of refined products used in cabotage.

Breakbulks

are practical in a few situations due to their small
carrying capacities.

They can be employed in small-scale

operations in Third World countries where unsophisticated
loading techniques are employed (Gibson and Shuford, 1991)
Otherwise, the ships are outmoded and of little use.

The

average breakbulk holds but one-third of the cargo held in a
typical RO/RO.

The breakbulks and tankers were acquired, it

seems, to take commercially unviable ships off the hands of
the maritime industry.

They were acquired to the exclusion

of the more useful military cargo carriers---RO/ROs.
The shortage in RO/ROs,

in both the RRF and the

Merchant Marine, which kept much cargo on the docks in
DS/DS, was extensively questioned after the war.

Seventy

percent of the commercial fleet is containerized, not RO/RO,
which is what the military needs most early in troop
deployments

(Donovan, 1991).

The shortage will not be

addressed in the commercial fleet, owing to the fact that
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RO/ROs are of limited commercial usefulness.

It appears

that the shortfall in DS/DS, examined in the next chapter,
drove current acquisition plans for twenty large RO/ROs of
300,000 square feet each (yielding a total capacity of six
million square feet).

Nine are programmed to be used in APS

for Army equipment while the other eleven are slated as
fast-sealift ships to carry surge cargo for Army heavy
divisions and their combat support.
The acquisitions are of questionable merit, however.
The RO/ROs are to be diesels capable of twenty-three knots.
This speed adds at least one week to a 10,000-mile transit
when compared to the ability of the current fleet

(eight

150,000 square foot RO/ROs that are capable of thirty-three
knots).

Their size, 950 feet by 105 feet at the beam, does

allow for Panama Canal transit, but it is too large for many
world ports.

Finally, the large capacity may preclude

efficient discharge at smaller ports, standing men and
material into more danger than necessary.

Despite the

objections of the MSC Commander, who advocated a package of
forty smaller RO/RO vessels (Donovan, 1992), purchase of the
large, slow RO/ROs has begun.

Congress appropriated $440

million in FY93 to order the first ten of these ships
1992) .
Another question with respect to funding priority
involves containerization.

There is no doubt that the
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(Card,

military must make more of its cargo amenable to
containerization.

This is slowly happening.

logistical problems, however.

There are

Today's containerships, as

opposed to first-generation containerships, require gantry
cranes ashore to unload their containers.
always available in third world ports.

These are not

To overcome this

problem, MARAD started a "T-ACS" program in 1982 that
converted existing commercial containerships to crane ships
to be used to unload other containerships in ports where
cranes are unavailable.

Additionally, T-ACS ships hold a

small amount of cargo, roughly the same amount as a typical
breakbulk ship in the fleet.
finished.
1993).

Their acquisition is nearly

Nine of the ten crane ships are on line (Pena,

Beside the T-ACS program, the government purchased

thousands of flat racks (floor pieces with steel frames
designed to fit in individual container spaces) to give
container ships the ability to carry oversized cargo.

The

containerization efforts cost over $100 million dollars.
Yet little of this capability was used during DS/DS, raising
serious doubt about its usefulness in sealift operations
(Gibson and Shuford, 1991).

For instance, only one port,

Military Ocean Terminal, Bayonne, was able to use flat racks
to load Army UH-1 helicopters (Hopkins, 1991).

still, MSC

maintains that T-ACS ships and containerization have a
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greater role to play than was shown in the Gulf War
(Donovan, 1992).
Lastly, the IRF remains a troubling entity.

IRF ships,

that round out the NDRF, make ships in the RRF look like
cutting-edge technology.

The IRF theoretically represents a

source of additional shipping in the highest degrees of
mobilization and attrition.

In reality, most of the ships

are WWII vintage and are hopelessly obsolete (Gibson and
Shuford, 1991).
DS/DS.

No ships in the fleet were mobilized for

Ongoing maintenance, which consists of little more

than cathodic protection, dehumidification, draft
measurements, and cursory hull inspections, does not support
any realistic opportunity for activation.

Many of the

ships, berthed in Suisun Bay, CA, Beaumont, TX, and
Fort Eustis, VA have degrade to unseaworthiness.

Scrap

metal is a depressed commodity currently, so the ships
continue to drain operating funds as the government slowly
sells them into scrap.
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CHAPTER THREE
DATA ANALYSIS

Introduction

Chapter Two presents persuasive evidence of
deficiencies in the US Merchant Marine and MARAD related to
sealift.

Nonetheless, the crux of this study is its

numerical analysis.

Hence a review of the methodology is

now in order.
As stated earlier, three cases are examined in this
study.

They include the operational case---what actually

happened, the normative case---what would have happened if
the assets available were optimally employed, and the future
case---what could be expected to happen in a similar
situation in 1999 based on current policy and acquisition
plans.
Each of these cases is examined at three times.
these times,
points .

Two of

three weeks and two months, are discrete

The other time is a period--Dne-half year.
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This

distinction is necessary.

The first two times pertain to

surge shipping, or the initial placement of cargo in a
theater of conflict.

Recent war games show that the first

three weeks of a crisis are critical.

By this time, a

deployed heavy division must have its combat support and
combat systems support (CS/CSS), such as line haul,
maintenance, service, and supply units, that need far more
cargo space than the division itself, in place (Pasquarette
and Foster, 1993).

Two months is similarly significant.

five-division contingency corps must be ready to fight,

A
that

is, it must have its CS/CSS in place, in any theater by that
time (Gibson and Shuford, 1991).

The last period relates to

sustainment shipping, or resupply and reinforcement of
troops that are already deployed.

This period has no nexus

to a specific operational plan of action.

Rather, it owes

to the fact that the only good test of sustainment sealift
in the last quarter-century has been DS/DS.

The sustainment

effort in DS/DS lasted approximately one-half year, so this
period is used.
The basis of this study is a simple comparison of cargo
carrying capability to cargo requirements.

The units used

are standard units of measurement in the literature, square
footage for surge sealift, and short tons for sustainment
sealift.
piecemeal)

Shipping and manning records

(both of which are

for the operation, supplied mainly but not
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exclusively by MARAD (an organization under the cognizance
of the US Department of Transportation), are compared
against operational requirements defined in a variety of
non-classified military sources (such as Fundamentals of
Force Planning, US Naval Institute Proceedings, Army and Sea
Power) to yield deficiencies in non-DoD sealift.

These

include outright shortages of merchant mariners, inadequate
equipment performance, mainly in engineering plants, and
finally,

shortages (from most significant to least

significant) in cargo space available on RO/RO ships,
container ships, and breakbulk carriers.

The constituents

of the overall deficiency are manifestly diverse.
Nonetheless, they can all be expressed in the final
variables---shortage of shipboard square footage or short
tons.
Timing is the essence of this study as most of the
deficiencies it documents are temporal.
deficiencies are significant.

Still, the

The normative case requires

on-time delivery as a tenet of national security policy .
Simply, cargo that arrives late is of little help to a force
that has been decimated or displaced.

Documenting these

temporal shortages, by analyzing the problem at two distinct
times and one period, is then the prime goal of this
chapter.
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The analysis is presented in four sections that follow.
The first section, data collection, presents the numbers and
assumptions that are used in the three subsequent sections.
The subsequent sections examine each case on the timeline
outlined earlier.

Data Collection

Over 3.3 million short tons of dry cargo were delivered
in DS/DS.

Foreign-flagged charters comprised the greatest

portion of this, about 713,000 short tons.
690,000 short tons.

The RRF shipped

A Special Middle East Space Agreement

(SMESA) was arranged with seven US-flagged liner companies
as a modification to their normal commercial service.

Under

SMESA, the carriers moved up to 2700 forty-foot equivalent
units

(FEUs) per week.

These containerized shipments, about

669,000 short tons, comprised over one-fifth of the total
effort.

US commercial charters, mostly short-term, shipped

480,000 tons.

MSC fast sealift vessels---seven of eight

were operational in the conflict---shipped 322,000 short
tons.

Finally, prepositioned assets, MPS and APS, shipped

164,000 and 116,000 short tons respectively.

Figures 2, 3,

and 4 graphically display the sealift effort in DS/DS.
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Figure 2 shows the constituent contributions in total, while
Figures 3 and 4 break down the contributions of government
assets and the US Merchant Marine.
The five tables that immediately follow are presented
in order to evaluate surge assets for DS/DS and the
performance of those assets.

Table 2 describes the 96-ship

RRF that existed during DS/DS.
a five-day readiness status.

Most of these ships were in
Forty-four of the seventy-nine

ships activated in the RRF in DS/DS were activated in the
surge portion of the conflict.

Of these forty-four, only

thirty-seven were tendered in time to participate in the
surge supply effort as defined in this study, that is, they
were able to offload their cargo within two months of the
beginning of the operation on August 10, 1990.

Tables 3

through 6 complete the description of the surge
mobilization, activation and tendering of the RRF.
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FIGURE 2: STRATEGIC SEALIFT OF DRY CARGO IN DS/DS

Percent of total sealift
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FIGURE 3: GOVERNMENT SEALIFT OF DRY CARGO IN DS/DS

Percent of government sealift
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FIGURE 4: US MERCHANT MARINE SEALIFT OF DRY CARGO IN DS/DS

Percent of US Merchant Marine sealift
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Source: Card, 1992b
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TABLE 2:

RRF SHIPS BY TYPE AND READINESS STATUS

Ship type

RRF-5

RRF-1O

RRF-20

Breakbulk

30

21

0

RO/RO

16

0

1

T-ACS

8

0

0

LASH/SEABEE

7

0

0

Tanker

3

6

2

Troopship

1

1

0

Source: RRFWG, 1991
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TABLE 3: SURGE SHIP ACTIVATION BY SHIP TYPE
Ship type(# activated)

Dates activated

RO/RO (17)

8/10-17

Breakbulk (17)

8/12-1;8/18-5;8/20-8; 8/30-1;
9/21-2

LASH/SEABEE

8/14-5;8/30-1;9/21-1

T-ACS

(2)

Tanker (1)

(7)

8/20-2
8/31-1

Source: Skinner, 1991; Card, 1992a; and RRFWG,
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1991

TABLE 4: TENDERING OF SURGE SHIPPING/DELAY TO ACTIVATION

Vessel

Type

Tender
Date

CAPE INSCRIPTION
CAPE HUDSON
CAPE DOMINGO
CAPE LOBOS
CAPE HORN
CAPE FAREWELL
CAPE FLATTERY
JUPITER
CAPE MOHICAN
CAPE ISABEL
CAPE MAY
CAPE DOUGLAS
CAPE HENRY
CAPE EDMONT
CAPE DUCATO
CAPE CLEAR
METEOR
COMET
CAPE BRETON
GULF BANKER
ADM CALLAGHAN
CAPE BORDA
CAPE JUBY
CAPE DECISION
WASHINGTON
CAPE CATOCHE
CAPE ALEXANDER
EQUALITY STATE
GULF TRADER
CAPE ARCHWAY
CAPE MENDOCINO
CORNHUSKER STATE
AMERICAN OSPREY
CAPE JOHNSON
MAINE
CAPE NOME
DEL VALLE

RO/RO
RO/RO
RO/RO
RO/RO
RO/RO
LASH
LASH
RO/RO
SEABEE
RO/RO
SEABEE
RO/RO
RO/RO
RO/RO
RO/RO
BB
RO/RO
RO/RO
BB
BB
RO/RO
BB
BB
RO/RO
BB
BB
BB
T-ACS
BB
BB
SEABEE
T-ACS
TANKER
BB
BB
BB
BB

15
15
18
18
19
19
20
20
21
21
22
23
24
24
24
24
25
25
25
26
26
26
28
29
29
30
31
31
01
03
03
07
11
11
12
13
14

Delay
(days)

AUG
AUG
AUG
AUG
AUG
AUG
AUG
AUG
AUG
AUG
AUG
AUG
AUG
AUG
AUG
AUG
AUG
AUG
AUG
AUG
AUG
AUG
AUG
AUG
AUG
AUG
AUG
AUG
SEP
SEP
SEP
SEP
SEP
SEP
SEP
SEP
SEP

Source: Skinner, 1991 and Card, 1992a
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5
5
8
8
9
9
10
10
7
11
8
13
14
14
14
12
15
15
7
8
16
8
10
19
11
10
11
11
12
14
20+
18
12
20+
20+
20+
20+

TABLE 5: SHIPS ACTIVATED FOR SURGE BUT TENDERED POST-SURGE
Vessel

Type

CAPE GIRARDEAU

BB

AUSTRAL LIGHTNING

LASH

CAPE GIBSON

BB

CAPE LAMBERT

RO/RO

CAPE FLORIDA

LASH

CAPE ANN

BB

CAPE DIAMOND

RO/RO

Source: Card, 1992a
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TABLE 6: RRF LATE TENDERING SUMMARY---SURGE SEALIFT

RRF-1O

RRF-20

Total

8

3

1

12

27

10

2

0

12

27

6-20 days late 15

1

0

16

36

20+ days late

4

0

0

4

9

37

6

1

44

100

Ship Tendered

on time
1-5 days l a t e

Total

RRF-5

Source: RRFWG, 1991
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%

Naturally, many lessons were learned in the aftermath
of DS/DS.

Chapter Two showed that deficiencies were spread

mainly between Merchant Marine assets and the RRF.

The path

chosen to rectify these deficiencies involves strengthening
RRF assets and prepositioned assets through purchases or
long-term charters.
for RRF assets.

Table 7 describes the acquisition path

Table 8 covers changes expected in

prepositioned assets.
The final, and most important, values in the collection
effort are those data used as base assumptions in the
analyses that follow.

These data are necessary owing to the

fact that the sealift effort was so massive.

Simply,

examining each of the 466 sealift voyages (Misch, 1994a) in
DS/DS as a discrete measurement of speed and cargo carriage
values for each voyage is beyond the scope of this analysis,
if possible at all.

The values that follow in Table 9 are

taken from values reported in or extracted from the
literature (which, naturally, vary slightly) .
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TABLE 7: RRF ASSETS--DS/OS THROUGH 1999

Ship type

OS/OS

1993

Breakbulk

51

48

49

T-ACS

8

9

10

LASH/SEABEE

7

7

7

17

18

36

3

6

2

Tanker

13

13

36

Total

96

98

140

RO/RO
Troopship

Source:

1999

USTRANSCOM, 1993 and RRFWG, 1991
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TABLE 8: DOD-ADMINISTERED SEALIFT

Time

FSS

ASSETS~PS/APS

AND FSS

APS

MPS

DS/DS

7 (1 aaC)

12

13

1993

8

12

13

1999

17

23

(incl. 11 LMSRs) 13

(incl. 9 LMSRs)

Source: USTRANSCaM, 1993 and RRFWG,
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1991

TABLE 9: CARGO AND SPEED ASSUMPTIONS (NOTIONAL VALUES)

Variable

Notional Value

Cargo Carriage
RO/RO ship (Donovan, 1992)

150, 0 0 0 f t

2

DE

LMSR ship (Donovan, 1992)

3 5 0, 000 f t

2

DE

fe

all others(barge carriers, T-ACS, BB)

50, 000

1 Division (Gibson and Shuford, 1991)

2, 8 00 , 0 0 0 f t

Stowage factor

0.75

(Marti, 1993)

Speed (maximum)
Fast Sealift ships
LMSRs

(Donovan,

all others

(Donovan,

1992)

1992)

33 knots
24 knots

(RRFWG, 1991)

22 knots
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2

DE
DE

Test No.1: Surge Shipping at Three Weeks

As stated earlier, the first cornerstone of an emplaced
force is a heavy division.

Defense planners expect this

division to be in place, anywhere, within three weeks of
call-up (Gibson and Shuford, 1991).

A heavy division

complements the initial landing of light troops and Marines .
In DS/DS, this force consisted of the 1st and 7th Marine
Expeditionary Brigades and the Army's 82nd Airborne
Division.

The light troops have their footprints, that is,

troops and basic weaponry, amphibiously landed or airlifted.
CS/CSS is supplied by MPS/APS.

The heavy division, whose

troops are also airlifted in, unlike the light troops and
Marines that preceded it, receives its unit equipment, 2.8
million ft 2 of CS/CSS, also referred to as unit equipment
(DE) from stateside assets.

In DS/DS, this division was the

24th Mechanized Infantry Division.
The first tier of sealift, fast sealift, is split
between MSC's fast sealift ships, converted SL-7s, and
MARAD's fast sealift RO/ROs.
RRF-5 ships.
ROS-4 program.

In DS/DS, MARAD's RO/ROs were

Today, they are undergoing conversion into the
In DS/DS, all eight MSC FSSs and all 17 RRF

RO/ROs were activated on 10 August.
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Seven MSC ships were

tendered at an average of 6 days.

Fifteen RRF RO/ROs were

tendered at a median of 12 days.
The operative case is examined first.
were tendered for fast sealift.

Twenty-two ships

The capacity of these ships

would be:
(22 s hip s ) (l50, 0 0 0 f t 2 /

S hip)

(. 7 5 )

= 2, 4 7 5, 0 0 0 f t 2

DE

This is less than the requirement, 2.8 million square feet.
Hence, sealift assets were insufficient regardless of the
time required to bring the ships to the loading ports, load
them, complete the transit, and unload them.

Nonetheless,

the tendering delay documented above, along with the fact
that the FSSs averaged only 23 knots

(Gibson and Shuford,

1991), would have made the fast-sealift component
unsuccessful in any case in DS/DS.
The normative case is examined next.

In this case, all

eight MSC FSSs and all seventeen MARAD FSSs would be
tendered on time, in five days and four days respectively.
The capacity of these ships would be:
(25 ships) (150, 000ft 2 / s h i p ) (. 75)
This exceeds the requirement.
time to transit.

Now,

= 2,812,500 ft 2

DE

one must look at the

Availabilities are 4 days for the MSC

ships and 5 days for the RRF ships.

Loading and unloading

times are approximately two days each for a total of four
days.

Ten thousand miles is transitted in twelve days at

thirty-three knots.

Adding these numbers,
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the MSC ships

arrive in twenty days, the RRF ships in twenty-one days.
The postulated arrivals, within the three week surge
requirement, point to a successful performance.
Finally, the future case is examined.

Plans call for

augmenting the RRF force with nineteen additional RO/ROs, to
a total of thirty-six, and placing nearly all RO/ROs in ROS4 status.

The MSC fleet of eight fast-sealift ships is to

gain nine LMSRs.

The LMSRs, with diesel plants capable of

only 24 knots, would require nearly eighteen days to
traverse 10,000 miles.

Adding this period to the activation

and loading periods would result in a period of well over
three weeks, so LMSRs can be eliminated from this portion of
the analysis.

Utilizing the calculation from the previous

two cases:
( 4 4 s hip s ) (150, 000 f t

2/

s hip) (. 7 5 )

This exceeds the requirement by 75 %.

= 4, 950, 00 0 f t 2 UE
Transit periods would

be the same as in the previous case, with the exception that
the new four-day availability for RRF ships would bring the
total time for all fast-sealift ships to twenty days---an
acceptable performance.
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Test No.2: Surge Shipping at Two Months

Defense planners had envisioned that five divisions
could be emplaced, with their equipment, anywhere within two
months (Gibson and Shuford, 1991).

These five divisions,

formed from the remainder of prepositioned assets,
deployed assets close to the area (in DS/DS,

forward

for example,

divisions were mobilized from Europe), airlift, and
amphibious landings, would require fourteen million (five
times 2.8 million) square feet of CS/CSS to be fully
functional.
The operative case, where chartered shipping was just
beginning to materialize and private US-flagged shipping was
not requisitioned---the effort was still almost exclusively
run with government assets---has already been exhaustively
examined by Shuford (1990).

Overall results of this paper

were reported in Fundamentals of Force Planning (1991).
Assuming that commanders desired the CS/CSS to move with the
divisions, the calculated shortfall in sealift was 5.8
million square feet of UE (Gibson and Shuford, 1991).

Given

the requirement of approximately 14 million square feet of
UE, one can infer that approximately eight million feet of
UE was delivered at the two-month point.
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The preceding numbers are well established.

This

study, then, will examine only the normative and future
cases.
In the normative case, the entire RRF would have been
mobilized in time for each ship to complete at least one
trip in the surge portion of the conflict.

The RRF is

legislatively mandated to have this capability.

The fast

sealift ships, with twenty and twenty-one day arrivals for
the first trip, would have sixteen-day transits (including
loading) thereafter.

They would be able to complete two

trips if, one, they were mobilized at the very outset of the
conflict, and two, no significant queuing delays occurred
nor any lengthy non-steaming maintenance was required while
completing three 10,000-mile trips (one to the theater, one
back to the states, and one back to the theater).

As the

normative case assumes best-case conditions, two deliveries
are assumed in the analysis.
Table 10 shows that had sealift gone as planned, there
still would have been a significant shortfall in a longrange conflict like DS/DS.

The nearly eleven million ft 2 of

cargo, while forty percent larger than the eight million ft 2
that were actually shipped within two months, was still well
short of the requirement.
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TABLE 10: SURGE SHIPPING AT TWO MONTHS, NORMATIVE CASE
Total (ft2)

Cargo (ft2)

stow Factor

Trips

25

150,000

0.75

1

2,812,500

8

150,000

0.75

2

1,800,000

RRF RO!RO 17

150,000

0.75

2

3,825,000

51

50,000

0.75

1

1,912,500

RRF T-ACS

8

50,000

0.75

1

300,000

RRF BARGE

7

50,000

0.75

1

262,500

Ship Type No.

MPS!APS
FSS

RRF BB

Total

10,912,000
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This established, it is now appropriate to examine this
case for 1999 based on current acquisition plans, which were
detailed in the previous section.

Again, only the steam-

driven fast-sealift ships would be capable of making two
trips in the period.

The LMSRs, while slightly faster than

the average for the fleet, would still be able to complete
only one transit.
Table 11 displays the result of this analysis .

A total

of twenty million square feet of DE capability in this
period is acceptable,

The capability exceeds the

requirement, fourteen million square feet, by over forty
percent.
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TABLE 11: SURGE SHIPPING AT TWO MONTHS, FUTURE CASE
Ship Type

No.

Cargo (ft2)

stow Factor

Trips

MPS/APS

25

150,000

0.75

1

2,812,500

+LMSRs

11

350,000

0.75

1

3,850,000

8

150,000

0.75

2

1,800,000

27

150,000

0.75

2

6,075,000

+LMSRs

9

350,000

0.75

1

3,150,000

RRF BB

49

50,000

0.75

1

1,837,500

RRF T-ACS

10

50,000

0.75

1

375,000

RRF BARGE

7

50,000

0.75

1

262,500

FSS
RRF RO/RO

Total (ft2)

20,162,500

Total
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Test No.3: Sustainment Shipping

DS/DS required a massive amount of sustainment sealift.
As opposed to the surge phase of the operation, in which
shipments consisted mainly of large-sized and wheeled and
tracked cargo

(tanks, personnel carriers, mortar

assemblies), the sustainment shipments consisted more of
stores and ammunition.

This cargo is necessarily measured

in short tons, not square feet.

The sustainment cargo is

slightly more suitable for the merchant fleet,
can be containerized.

as more of it

This is not to say that DE shipment

stopped after the surge phase of the operation.

It is

simply measured in short tons for this portion of the
analysis

(a FSS carries 15,000 tons of cargo fully loaded).

Nonetheless,

it was a far smaller portion of the total

cargo.
The operational case is now examined.

An emplaced

armored division requires 800 tons of cargo per day
(Van Peursem, 1994).

The five heavy divisions alone

required 120,000 tons of cargo per month (4,000 tons per day
times 30 days).

This does not include the Marines, hospital

units, or army light troops that were also deployed.
Additionally, stockpiles need to be amassed for offensive
operations.

Sustainment requirements triple, at least, when
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troops are engaged (Van Peursem, 1994).

Given that

offensive operations were imminent when the build-up was
complete at the end of 1990, a reasonable estimate for
required cargo delivery after this point would be 360,000
tons per month (120,000 times three).
Examining sealift deliveries at this point in Table 12,
one notes that deliveries far exceeded the baseline
engagement criteria for the emplaced divisions.

In fact,

nearly one million short tons of cargo, over one-fourth of
the total cargo shipped for the operation, was delivered in
January alone.

From this comparison, and ultimately, the

success of the mission, one can state that sustainment
sealift was sufficient in DS/DS.
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TABLE 12: SURGE AND SUSTAINMENT SEALIFT IN DS/DS

Month

Dry Cargo(short tons)

Surge

Aug./Sep. 90

505,000

Sustainment

Oc tober 90

434,000

November 90

264,000

December 90

448,000

January 91

910,000

February 91

527,000

March 91

301,000

Total

3,390,000

Source: GAO, 1992
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As sealift in the operational case proved sufficient,
there is no need to detail the normative case.

Any

improvements in a best-case analysis would, manifestly,
further increase the margin of sufficiency.
This leaves the future case to be examined.
primary assumptions are made.

Four

First, all government-

administered acquisitions will be complete by 1999.

Second,

America's foreign trade merchant fleet will be virtually
extinct by 1999 (Card, 1992c).
expired by that point.

All ODS and CDS will have

Barring significant reform of

maritime laws, the merchant fleet will have shrunk to a
brown-water cabotage fleet.

Third, activation of the

Sealift Readiness Program or outright requisitioning of US
Merchant Marine assets will not occur, just as it did not
occur during DS/DS, for it would cripple many industries,
including strategic industries, that rely on cabotage.
Finally, foreign shipping will not be available.

This is a

reasonable assumption as the next long-range operation may
not be any where near as popular on the international front
as DS/DS.

Assuming this comes to pass, sealift becomes an

operation that relies on government assets exclusively.
This begs the question whether government assets, which
comprised 41.1 % of sealift in DS/DS, will be adequate to
sustain an operation of DS/DS's size and geographical
separation in the future.
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For government controlled assets to deliver the whole
sustainment cargo, the carrying capacity shown in DS/DS will
have to increase roughly 130 %.
this capability?

Does the 1999 fleet possess

The following analysis suggests it does

not.
The analysis shown in Table 13 takes the percentage of
sealift in DS/DS by the various subgroups, and projects
future capability based on changes in capability of the
fleet.

This is done with the use of a weighted-average

cargo-carrying multiplier for each subgroup.

The multiplier

is relatively straightforward for subgroups where the change
involves ships of the same cargo size and speed.

For

instance, the MSC FSSs go from seven converted SL-7s to
eight converted SL-7s.

The multiplier in this case is

simple, eight divided by seven, or 1.14.

Where different

ship types are introduced, their cargo handling capabilities
and speed must be taken into account.

For example, the APS

fleet adds 11 LMSRs to its 12 RO/ROs.

The LMSRs have 2.33

times the cargo-carrying capacity (350,000 ft 2 versus
150,000 ft 2 1 , but only 0.71 times the speed capability (24
knots versus 33 knots) of the RO/ROs.

The product of these

numbers is weighted on a per-ship basis with the number of
new ships introduced, added to the existing inventory, and
this result is divided by the original inventory to yield
the multiplication factor, or multiplier, in Table 13.
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TABLE 13: SUSTAINMENT SEALIFT, FUTURE CASE

Subgroup

OS/OS%

OS/OS

1999

Mult.

1999%

MPS

5.2

13 Ro/ROs

13 Ro/ROs

1. 00

5.2

APS

3.7

12 Ro/ROs

12 Ro/ROs

2.52

9.3

1.14

11.4

1. 82

40.1

11 LMSRs

MSC FSS

10.2

RRF

22.0

8 FSS

7 FSS
17 Ro/RO

27 Ro/RO

7 BARGE

10 BARGE

43 BIB
6 T-ACS

43 BIB
10 T-ACS
9 LMSRs
66.0

Total
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Table 13 shows that sustainment sealift can not be provided
by the surge fleet.

Reliance on government assets

exclusively will provide roughly two-thirds of the required
sealift in an operation the scope and size of DS/DS, despite
the vast improvement in government-administered assets.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSIONS

The preceding analysis yields mixed results.

In some

cases, sealift is sufficient, in others, it is not.

Table

14 displays the result for each of the cases analyzed.
The operational case in DS/DS shows that while
sustainment shipping was satisfactory, surge sealift assets
were insufficient.

Surge shipping was unsuccessful in the

initial stage due to inefficient use of ships.

This was

exacerbated by an outright shortage of ships necessary to
complete the surge shipping effort in the required two
months.

Sustainment shipping was satisfactory.

This

success owed to the availability of foreign shipping,

the

existing ability of reserve forces to move cargo, and the
residual capability of the US Merchant Marine.
The analysis of the normative case contains one change
from the operational case.

Initial surge delivery of one

heavy division would have been satisfactory if fast-sealift
assets performed up to their capability.

It is reasonable

to surmise that operational and administrative improvements
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TABLE 14: RESULTS OF DATA ANALYSIS- IS SEALIFT SUFFICIENT?

Sealift

Time

Requirement

3

1 Heavy Div

Operational

Normative 1999

Stage

Initial

6

wks

2.8x10

Total

2

5 Heavy Div

Surge
Sustainment

mos
~

yr

14x10

6

ft

Yes

Yes

No 1

No

Yes

Yes

No

2

Surge

ft

No

2

3.2x10 6 fe

Yes

lTh i s case was not analyzed in this study as it was
thoroughly analyzed by Shuford (1990) and portions of the results
were subsequently published (Gibson and Shuford, 1991).
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implemented by MARAD and MSC would in fact bring fastsealift capability up to speed.

Regardless, the total surge

effort would fall short of the mark .

Assets are

insufficient, no matter how they are employed.
Examining the surge portions of the future case yields
some interesting insights.

Initial surge capability remains

acceptable from the normative case, although the acquisition
of LMSRs adds nothing due to inherent speed restrictions.
Total surge cargo is reversed from a six million ft 2
shortfall to a similarly sized surplus.

This improvement in

fast-sealift assets, by MARAD and MSC, increases the margin
of acceptability by 75 %.

In fact,

it is a step toward the

ability to provide fast-sealift provisions in two regional
conflicts.

This capability has been a long-held tenet of

national military policy, unfeasible for at least the last
two decades, that received much attention recently as the
Secretary of Defense proposed scaling it back to a "fighthold-fight" policy.

From these data, it appears that as far

as surge shipping is required, it is indeed possible for the
government to purchase sufficient assets for its execution.
Sustainment shipping is another matter, however.

An

extensive upgrade in the capability of shipping that is
government-owned or leased is not sufficient to stem the
tide of a declining Merchant Marine.
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This is especially

true if foreign shipping is not available---a distinct
possibility.

In fact,

government shipping falls a full

third short the requirements seen in DS/DS.

Simply, it is

not practical to buy a fleet for sustainment sealift.
shipping requirements are too great.

The

Sustainment shipping

must be supplied, at least partially, by its historical
source---the US Merchant Marine .
The results of the analysis, together with the
disturbing points in the literature review, reveal a problem
that is broad in size and scope.

The four negative cases in

the analysis support the hypothesis.

Even one negative case

is unacceptable from the standpoint of national security.
More important, the problem exists today and will exist well
into the future.

Current efforts appear to fix the problems

with surge shipping while letting sustainment shipping slip
toward oblivion.

Nonetheless, it is possible, somewhere in

a spectra of political, financial,

industrial, and military

tradeoffs, to fix all of the problems related to sealift.
On this matter, recommendations are made in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE
RECOMMENDATIONS

Problems with sealift related to funding,
and operations were plainly displayed by DS/DS.

acquisition,
Luckily,

Iraq proved to be a surprisingly weak adversary and
deficiencies in sealift did not lead to the loss of American
lives.

Nonetheless, lessons learned point to the need for

reform.

Given current trends, reform in the end will equate

only to federal acquisition of more sealift assets and finetuning of some laws and regulations---while not addressing
the related issues of civilian crewing, reemployment rights,
shipbuilding, unfair foreign competition, and many other
issues that affect the economic potential of the maritime
industry.

Concerned Americans may ask why the United States

is willing to spend hundreds of billions of dollars annually
on national defense, but is not willing to pay the
relatively small cost of keeping a maritime industry that
supports that defense viable (Misch, 1993).

One might also

ask why a reserve fleet is maintained at considerable cost
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that is not optimal in composition, condition or readiness.
Hence, the following recommendations are forwarded.
First and foremost,

fund sealift in a manner that is

sufficient to meet supply requirements for reasonable
contingencies.
objectives.

Sealift is essential to national defense

The finest soldiers and equipment in the world

are useless if they cannot be transported to the theater of
conflict in due time.
Second, take steps to halt the decline of the US
Merchant Marine.

This is essential.

Sustainment sealift

can not be bought, at least in the current climate.
Sustainment shipping has always been the Merchant Marine's
concern and should continue to be.

The cost of the military

maintaining these assets will be prohibitive.

The capital

requirements to maintain and operate sealift assets for all
contingencies and all levels of mobilization are too great,
even in times of $350 billion annual defense budgets, let
alone today's $260 billion dollar defense budgets.

Make

private ownership of ships a worthwhile venture through
changes in the tax code and subsidization.

Enact maritime

subsidies that at least double the residual ODS payments of
today to bring them to an inflation-adjusted level of the
early 1980s.

Restore CDS subsidies in some form.

Third, continue and expand the building of strategic
sealift ships and devote more assets to prepositioned ships.
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Do not do this to the exclusion of commercial shipping,
especially with respect to sustainment sealift.
Nonetheless, surge shipping requirements are probably best
met with dedicated assets.

Continue construction to allay

the crucial shortage in RO/RO vessels.
smaller (less than 600 feet)

Make some vessels

and faster (with steam plants)

to enhance total operational utility.
Fourth, address manning issues.
Merchant Marine Academy.

Do not close the

Provide protection to merchant

mariners in times of deployment through salary protection
and reemployment rights.

Continue efforts with seafaring

unions to make the shrinking labor pool more reliable.
Fifth, overhaul the National Defense Reserve Forces.
Redistribute the types and numbers of ships in the RRF.
Phase out, rather than increase, breakbulk shipping as part
of the military's overdue shift toward containerization of
applicable cargoes.
categories.

Establish realistic readiness

Maintain the RRF in a high state of readiness

by continuing programs implemented by MARAD after DS/DS,
especially with respect to maintenance of the fleet.
Eliminate the IRF.

It is a drain on valuable resources and

creates a chimera of additional capability.
Finally, and most important, realign contingency
planning for sealift to cover "worst case" scenarios.
not assume that foreign shipping will be available for
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Do

sealift, for there are many possible conflicts where the US
would act unilaterally.

Do not base strategic planning on

lOO-percent on-time deployment of sealift assets.

Lastly,

program adverse possibilities, such as attrition of
shipping, that will no doubt occur against a foe more worthy
than Iraq.
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This established, it is now appropriate to examine this
case for 1999 based on current acquisition plans, which were
detailed in the previous section.

Again, only the steam-

driven fast-sealift ships would be capable of making two
trips in the period.

The LMSRs, while slightly faster than

the average for the fleet, would still be able to complete
only one transit.
Table 11 displays the result of this analysis.

A total

of twenty million square feet of DE capability in this
period is acceptable,

The capability exceeds the

requirement, fourteen million square feet, by over forty
percent.
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Test No.3: Sustainment Shipping

DS/DS required a massive amount of sustainment sealift.
As opposed to the surge phase of the operation, in which
shipments consisted mainly of large-sized and wheeled and
tracked cargo (tanks, personnel carriers, mortar
assemblies), the sustainment shipments consisted more of
stores and ammunition.

This cargo is necessarily measured

in short tons, not square feet.

The sustainment cargo is

slightly more suitable for the merchant fleet, as more of it
can be containerized.

This is not to say that DE shipment

stopped after the surge phase of the operation.

It is

simply measured in short tons for this portion of the
analysis

(a FSS carries 15,000 tons of cargo fully loaded).

Nonetheless, it was a far smaller portion of the total
cargo.
The operational case is now examined.

An emplaced

armored division requires 800 tons of cargo per day
(Van Peursem, 1994).

The five heavy divisions alone

required 120,000 tons of cargo per month (4,000 tons per day
times 30 days).

This does not include the Marines, hospital

units, or army light troops that were also deployed.
Additionally, stockpiles need to be amassed for offensive
operations.

Sustainment requirements triple, at least, when
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troops are engaged (Van Peursem, 1994).

Given that

offensive operations were imminent when the build-up was
complete at the end of 1990, a reasonable estimate for
required cargo delivery after this point would be 360,000
tons per month (120,000 times three).
Examining sealift deliveries at this point in Table 12,
one notes that deliveries far exceeded the baseline
engagement criteria for the emplaced divisions.

In fact,

nearly one million short tons of cargo, over one-fourth of
the total cargo shipped for the operation, was delivered in
January alone.

From this comparison, and ultimately, the

success of the mission, one can state that sustainment
sealift was sufficient in DS/DS.
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TABLE 12: SURGE AND SUSTAINMENT SEALIFT IN DS/DS
Month

Dry Cargo(short tons)

Surge

Aug./Sep. 90

505,000

Sustainment

October 90

434,000

November 90

264,000

December 90

448,000

January 91

910,000

February 91

527,000

March 91

301,000

Total

3,390,000

Source: GAO, 1992
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As sealift in the operational case proved sufficient,
there is no need to detail the normative case.

Any

improvements in a best-case analysis would, manifestly,
further increase the margin of sufficiency.
This leaves the future case to be examined.
primary assumptions are made.

Four

First, all government-

administered acquisitions will be complete by 1999.

Second,

America's foreign trade merchant fleet will be virtually
extinct by 1999 (Card, 1992c) .
expired by that point.

All ODS and CDS will have

Barring significant reform of

maritime laws, the merchant fleet will have shrunk to a
brown-water cabotage fleet.

Third, activation of the

Sealift Readiness Program or outright requisitioning of US
Merchant Marine assets will not occur, just as it did not
occur during DS/DS, for it would cripple many industries,
including strategic industries, that rely on cabotage.
Finally, foreign shipping will not be available.

This is a

reasonable assumption as the next long-range operation may
not be any where near as popular on the international front
as DS/DS.

Assuming this comes to pass, sealift becomes an

operation that relies on government assets exclusively.
This begs the question whether government assets, which
comprised 41.1 % of sealift in DS/DS, will be adequate to
sustain an operation of DS/DS's size and geographical
separation in the future.
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For government controlled assets to deliver the whole
sustainment cargo, the carrying capacity shown in DS/DS will
have to increase roughly 130 %.
this capability?

Does the 1999 fleet possess

The following analysis suggests it does

not.
The analysis shown in Table 13 takes the percentage of
sealift in DS/DS by the various subgroups, and projects
future capability based on changes in capability of the
fleet.

This is done with the use of a weighted-average

cargo-carrying multiplier for each subgroup.

The multiplier

is relatively straightforward for subgroups where the change
involves ships of the same cargo size and speed.

For

instance, the MSC FSSs go from seven converted SL-7s to
eight converted SL-7s.

The multiplier in this case is

simple, eight divided by seven, or 1.14.

Where different

ship types are introduced, their cargo handling capabilities
and speed must be taken into account .

For example, the APS

fleet adds 11 LMSRs to its 12 RO/ROs.

The LMSRs have 2.33

times the cargo-carrying capacity (350,000 ft 2 versus
150,000 ft 2 ) , but only 0.71 times the speed capability (24
knots versus 33 knots) of the RO/ROs.

The product of these

numbers is weighted on a per-ship basis with the number of
new ships introduced, added to the existing inventory, and
this result is divided by the original inventory to yield
the multiplication factor, or multiplier, in Table 13.
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TABLE 13: SUSTAINMENT SEALIFT, FUTURE CASE

Subgroup

DS/DS%

DS/DS

1999

Mult.

1999%

MPS

5.2

13 Ro/ROs

13 Ro/ROs

1. 00

5.2

APS

3.7

12 Ro/ROs

12 Ro/ROs

2.52

9.3

1.14

11. 4

1. 82

40.1

11 LMSRs
MSC FSS

10.2

RRF

22.0

7 FSS

8 FSS

17 Ro/RO

27 Ro/RO

7 BARGE

10 BARGE

43 BIB
6 T-ACS

43 BIB
10 T-ACS
9 LMSRs
66.0

Total
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Table 13 shows that sustainment sealift can not be provided
by the surge fleet.

Reliance on government assets

exclusively will provide roughly two-thirds of the required
sealift in an operation the scope and size of DS/DS, despite
the vast improvement in government-administered assets.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSIONS

The preceding analysis yields mixed results.

In some

cases, sealift is sufficient, in others, it is not.

Table

14 displays the result for each of the cases analyzed.
The operational case in DS/DS shows that while
sustainment shipping was satisfactory, surge sealift assets
were insufficient.

Surge shipping was unsuccessful in the

initial stage due to inefficient use of ships.

This was

exacerbated by an outright shortage of ships necessary to
complete the surge shipping effort in the required two
months.

Sustainment shipping was satisfactory.

This

success owed to the availability of foreign shipping, the
existing ability of reserve forces to move cargo, and the
residual capability of the US Merchant Marine.
The analysis of the normative case contains one change
from the operational case.

Initial surge delivery of one

heavy division would have been satisfactory if fast-sealift
assets performed up to their capability.

It is reasonable

to surmise that operational and administrative improvements
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TABLE 14: RESULTS OF DATA ANALYSIS- IS SEALIFT SUFFICIENT?

Sealift

Time

Requirement

3

1 Heavy Div

Operational

Normative 1999

Stage

Initial
Surge

wks

2.8x10

Total

2

5 Heavy Div

Surge
Sustainment

mos

1?-

yr

14x10

6

6

No

Yes

Yes

No1

No

Yes

Yes

No

fe

ft

2

3.2x10 6 ft 2

Yes

lThis case was not analyzed in this study as it was
thoroughly analyzed by Shuford (1990) and portions of the results
were subsequently published (Gibson and Shuford, 1991).
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implemented by MARAD and MSC would in fact bring fastsealift capability up to speed.

Regardless, the total surge

effort would fall short of the mark.

Assets are

insufficient, no matter how they are employed.
Examining the surge portions of the future case yields
some interesting insights.

Initial surge capability remains

acceptable from the normative case, although the acquisition
of LMSRs adds nothing due to inherent speed restrictions.
Total surge cargo is reversed from a six million ft 2
shortfall to a similarly sized surplus.

This improvement in

fast-sealift assets, by MARAD and MSC, increases the margin
of acceptability by 75%.

In fact,

it is a step toward the

ability to provide fast-sealift provisions in two regional
conflicts.

This capability has been a long-held tenet of

national military policy, unfeasible for at least the last
two decades,

that received much attention recently as the

Secretary of Defense proposed scaling it back to a "fighthold-fight" policy.

From these data, it appears that as far

as surge shipping is required, it is indeed possible for the
government to purchase sufficient assets for its execution.
Sustainment shipping is another matter, however.

An

extensive upgrade in the capability of shipping that is
government-owned or leased is not sufficient to stern the
tide of a declining Merchant Marine.
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This is especially

true if foreign shipping is not available---a distinct
possibility.

In fact,

government shipping falls a full

third short the requirements seen in DS/DS.

Simply, it is

not practical to buy a fleet for sustainment sealift.
shipping requirements are too great.

The

Sustainment shipping

must be supplied, at least partially, by its historical
source---the US Merchant Marine.
The results of the analysis, together with the
disturbing points in the literature review, reveal a problem
that is broad in size and scope.

The four negative cases in

the analysis support the hypothesis.

Even one negative case

is unacceptable from the standpoint of national security.
More important, the problem exists today and will exist well
into the future.

Current efforts appear to fix the problems

with surge shipping while letting sustainment shipping slip
toward oblivion.

Nonetheless, it is possible, somewhere in

a spectra of political, financial,

industrial, and military

tradeoffs, to fix all of the problems related to sealift.
On this matter, recommendations are made in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE
RECOMMENDATIONS

Problems with sealift related to funding, acquisition,
and operations were plainly displayed by DS/DS .

Luckily,

Iraq proved to be a surprisingly weak adversary and
deficiencies in sealift did not lead to the loss of American
lives.

Nonetheless, lessons learned point to the need for

reform.

Given current trends, reform in the end will equate

only to federal acquisition of more sealift assets and finetuning of some laws and regulations---while not addressing
the related issues of civilian crewing, reemployment rights,
shipbuilding, unfair foreign competition, and many other
issues that affect the economic potential of the maritime
industry.

Concerned Americans may ask why the United States

is willing to spend hundreds of billions of dollars annually
on national defense, but is not willing to pay the
relatively small cost of keeping a maritime industry that
supports that defense viable (Misch, 1993).

One might also

ask why a reserve fleet is maintained at considerable cost
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that is not optimal in composition, condition or readiness.
Hence, the following recommendations are forwarded.
First and foremost,

fund sealift in a manner that is

sufficient to meet supply requirements for reasonable
contingencies.
objectives.

Sealift is essential to national defense

The finest soldiers and equipment in the world

are useless if they cannot be transported to the theater of
conflict in due time.
Second, take steps to halt the decline of the US
Merchant Marine.

This is essential.

Sustainment sealift

can not be bought, at least in the current climate.
Sustainment shipping has always been the Merchant Marine's
concern and should continue to be.

The cost of the military

maintaining these assets will be prohibitive.

The capital

requirements to maintain and operate sealift assets for all
contingencies and all levels of mobilization are too great,
even in times of $350 billion annual defense budgets, let
alone today's $260 billion dollar defense budgets.

Make

private ownership of ships a worthwhile venture through
changes in the tax code and subsidization.

Enact maritime

subsidies that at least double the residual ODS payments of
today to bring them to an inflation-adjusted level of the
early 1980s.

Restore CDS subsidies in some form.

Third, continue and expand the building of strategic
sealift ships and devote more assets to prepositioned ships.
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Do not do this to the exclusion of commercial shipping,
especially with respect to sustainment sealift.
Nonetheless, surge shipping requirements are probably best
met with dedicated assets.

Continue construction to allay

the crucial shortage in RO/RO vessels.
smaller (less than 600 feet)

Make some vessels

and faster (with steam plants)

to enhance total operational utility.
Fourth, address manning issues.
Merchant Marine Academy.

Do not close the

Provide protection to merchant

mariners in times of deployment through salary protection
and reemployment rights.

Continue efforts with seafaring

unions to make the shrinking labor pool more reliable.
Fifth, overhaul the National Defense Reserve Forces.
Redistribute the types and numbers of ships in the RRF.
Phase out, rather than increase, breakbulk shipping as part
of the military's overdue shift toward containerization of
applicable cargoes.
categories.

Establish realistic readiness

Maintain the RRF in a high state of readiness

by continuing programs implemented by MARAD after DS/DS,
especially with respect to maintenance of the fleet.
Eliminate the IRF.

It is a drain on valuable resources and

creates a chimera of additional capability.
Finally, and most important, realign contingency
planning for sealift to cover "worst case" scenarios.
not assume that foreign shipping will be available for
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Do

sealift, for there are many possible conflicts where the US
would act unilaterally.

Do not base strategic planning on

lOO-percent on-time deployment of sealift assets.

Lastly,

program adverse possibilities, such as attrition of
shipping, that will no doubt occur against a foe more worthy
than Iraq.
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